Deafening Silence? Marxism, International Historical Sociology and the Spectre of Eurocentrism
Cemal Burak Tansel   1 Approaching the centenary of its establishment as a formal discipline, International Relations today challenges the ahistorical and aspatial frameworks advanced by the theories of earlier luminaries. Yet, despite a burgeoning body of literature built on the transdisciplinary efforts bridging International Relations and its long-separated nomothetic relatives, the new and emerging conceptual frameworks have not been able to effectively overcome the challenge posed by the Ônon-WestÕ. The recent wave of international historical sociology has highlighted possible trajectories to problematise the myopic and unipolar conceptions of the international system; however, the question of Eurocentrism still lingers in the developing research programmes. This article interjects into the ongoing historical materialist debate in international historical sociology by: (1) conceptually and empirically challenging the rigid boundaries of the extant approaches; and (2) critically assessing the postulations of recent theorising on Ôthe internationalÕ, capitalist states-system/geopolitics and uneven and combined development. While the significance of the present contributions in international historical sociology should not be understated, it is argued that the ÔEurocentric cageÕ still occupies a dominant ontological position which essentially silences Ôconnected historiesÕ and conceals the role of inter-societal relations in the making of the modern states-system and capitalist geopolitics.
Human history is like palaeontology. Owing to a certain judicial blindness even the best intelligences absolutely fail to see the things which lie in front of their noses. Later, when the moment has arrived, we are surprised to find traces everywhere of what we failed to see. (Marx, 1965: 140) If one were to recapitulate the mercurial disciplinary history of international relations (IR) today, a cynical voice could claimÑwith an interpretive license from Karl Marx and
Friedrich EngelsÑthat Ôthe history of all hitherto existing IR theories is the history of unfulfilled promisesÕ. This rather bold, if a bit melodramatic declaration is certainly an overstatement, yet it is not an empty one given the proclamations of the disciplineÕs Ôfailure as an intellectual projectÕ (Buzan and Little, 2001 ) have gained common currency. Indeed, contemporary IR still struggles with a number of profound challenges posed by previous generations, ranging from the chronic ahistoricism and state-centrism of its structural variants to the multiplex forms of autocentrisms which continue to haunt a vast palette of its conceptual approaches. Facing up to some, but not all, of these challenges, the discipline has variously crafted crucial ÔfixesÕ and made several radical ÔturnsÕ towards critical approaches.
One such attempt to reorient theoretical and ontological underpinnings has been the so-called Ôhistorical turnÕ, a multifaceted cross-disciplinary effort aimed at situating historical evidence and exposition at the heart of theory construction, derivation and verification. IRÕs initial engagement and its ensuing synthesis with historical sociology materialised within the parameters of this historical turn and it was thus welcomed as a necessary move to eliminate
the shortcomings of what has often been referred to as the statist, ahistorical conundrum of its mainstream theorising. This ÔnecessityÕ to historicise metatheoretical assumptions and exorcise mechanistic determinations had become so exigent that one scholar exclaimed that
Ôthe disciplineÕs future rests upon coming to terms with these new [historical] sociological argumentsÕ (Jarvis 1989: 291) . Hence international historical sociology (IHS) emerged as an antidote to different modes of homogenising and selectively historicist tendencies in the discipline, ranging from neorealist IRÕs Ôhistoricism of stasisÕ which Ôfreezes the political institutions of the current world orderÕ (Ashley, 1984: 257) to international political economyÕs Ôfever of naturalizing the present and viewing the past through the lens of the presentÕ (Seabrooke, 2007: 396) . Much like the historical sociology literature from which it 2 drew major methodological and analytical frameworks, inaugural works in the commencing IHS literature were dominated by a Weberian allegiance to methodological pluralism. Yet the promise of the Ôsecond waveÕ lost its place to a new Ôthird waveÕ in little over a decade, as the mounting theoretical pressure on the Weberian project shifted the objective of IHS away from a mere ÔinjectionÕ of history and necessitated Ôa sociological explanation and account of how the international system has always taken a pluralistic formÕ (Hobson, 2011: 150) .
The term International Historical Sociology is associated most directly with Fred HallidayÕs contributions, but 2 has also been criticised for reifying the nationalist bias of classical sociology which Ôcarries epistemological connotations and limits . . . that require denationalizationÕ (Teschke, 2011 (Teschke, : 1106 . While TeschkeÕs call for a redefinition from international historical sociology to Ôsocial history of spatial relationsÕ correctly highlights the limitations of HallidayÕs projectÑÔto produce a sociology at once historical and internationalÕ (Halliday 2002: 245 original emphasis)Ñthis article employs the IHS designation to signal the crucial position the ÔinternationalÕ occupies in analysing the trajectory of long-term, multi-scalar developments. # 2
The aim of this paper is not to provide an overview of or to problematise the whole emerging corpus in this so called Ôthird waveÕ, but to specifically challenge the vestiges of (Pasha, 2009: 536) .
3. A paternalistic theory of history defending the universal validity of the European trajectory and the ultimate necessity for others to imitate the same experience. EuropeÕs sinsÕ (Wallerstein, 1997: 102) , including colonialism and imperialism.
In Marxist IHS, the Eurocentric substratum that permeates the conceptual discussions and distorts the ways in which the historical evidence is extracted does not necessarily stem from a concentrated effort to replicate a ÔEuropean miracleÕ discourse, nor does it emerge as a result of being locked in a form of methodological nationalism, but from the complete absence of the non-West in theoretical frameworks as an active agent of the global history of socio-economic development. Accordingly, the non-West does not even get discarded from the narrative since it was never included in the first place. Borrowing the term from Adam Morton (2013: 133) , I describe this social, historical and geographical lacuna in the literature as an Ôontological exteriorityÕ through which the rest of the world is either completely read off or extrapolated only as a comparative utility to prioritise or underscore the European experience. Thus in much of Marxist IHS, the dislocation of the non-West from a reciprocal agential axis is not necessarily a deliberate move on the scholarsÕ part, but is a form of what John M. Hobson calls Ôsubliminal EurocentrismÕ (2007: 93) , an often unconsciously maintained template that survives due to the very non-existence of the extra-European world in the foundational elements of established theories. The challenge for Marxist IHS then is to re-interiorise the non-West and incorporate it back into the most fundamental theoretical
discussions regarding the conditions of multilinear socio-economic development that can provide a comprehensive causal map of Ôdiachronic intersocietal unityÕ, i.e. the international (Shanin, 1983: 18) .
The argument unfolds through a brief review of the social property relations approach.
I maintain that Robert BrennerÕs theory of social property relations cannot form the basis of an internationalist theory as it operates on an extremely particularistic conception of social change which fails both to explain coeval processes in the rest of the world and to offer analytical tools to integrate the non-West into his strictly ÔAnglocentricÕ theory. Subsequently, the argument is expanded to scrutinise whether similar factors are visible in the recent discussions on the nature of the ÔmodernÕ international system, geopolitics and capitalismÕs relationship with the states-system. Here the focus is on two significant contributions from Benno Teschke (2003) and Hannes Lacher (2006) , both of whom have developed intricate reinterpretations of the states-system, sovereignty and territoriality in capitalism by utilising BrennerÕs theory of social property relations. While offering a number of innovative arguments and compelling revisions on the development of the European states-system, the Political Marxism of Teschke and Lacher is equally imbued with a stringent conception of the history of capitalism and the modern states-system within which their origins, development and expansion are predominantly explained through an exclusively European lens. This in turn creates an extremely internalist perspective wherein the ÔinternationalÕ becomes necessarily subjugated to an Ôinter-EuropeanÕ position.
Following the critique of Political Marxism, the article then moves on to the analysis of one of the most important recent contributions in the field, namely Justin RosenbergÕs reconceptualisation of Leon TrotskyÕs concept of uneven and combined development (U&CD).
RosenbergÕs intervention promises a potential resolution to the Eurocentric woes of the discipline as it aims to construct a general theory of inter-societal relations in the form of the
ÔinternationalÕ. Theorising the international thus would solve the disciplineÕs perennial problem by postulating the ways in which the process of uneven and combined development has historically created a ÔÔpoliticalÕ multiplicity which specifically entails coexisting entitiesÕ (Rosenberg, 2010: 170) . Yet RosenbergÕs ÔtranshistoricalÕ reincarnation has been challenged vigorously by a number of contributions which claim that the concept has to be understood exclusively with reference to capitalism, thus is only applicable to the modern epoch of imperialism and capitalist development. In this section, I lay stress on the continuing problems related to the selective historicism and lack of substantial engagement with peripheral voices in the ÔmodernistÕ version of the U&CD. I contend that while the renewed U&CD literature has succeeded in tempering a Ôdeafening silenceÕ on the non-West in Marxist IHS, it has not fully exhausted the potential of employing a non-Eurocentric methodology.
The critical review is concluded by briefly engaging with the ways in which Marxist IHS has positioned the Ottoman Empire within the world-historical expansion of capitalism, I
refute several reductionist narratives operationalised to evaluate a Ônon-WesternÕ society by the proponents of U&CD and Political Marxism. I argue that the cursory treatment the Ottoman Empire receives in the literature is neither an anomaly nor a justified omission, but is an indicator of the scope of exteriorisation that the non-West as a whole is subjected to in
IHS.
The final part of the paper re-asserts the importance of MarxÕs late writings on world history and ethnology in which he strictly rejects crude stadial conceptions of social development and attempts to devise the building blocks of a theory of Ôthe global heterogeneity of societal forms, dynamics and interdependenceÕ (Shanin, 1983: 6 (Bhambra, 2007: 143 original emphasis) . Such a reconstruction would only appear to be radically Ônon-MarxistÕ (Hobson, 2011: 148) or be perceived as an absolute rejection of Marxist categories if Ôthe ideas which Marx was nurturing at the end of his lifeÑand especially at the end of the 1870s and beginning of the 1880sÕ (Vitkin, 1982: 70) are completely overlooked.
Frozen history of the theory of social property relations
In what has come to be termed the ÔBrenner DebateÕ Robert Brenner provided an outstanding combination of economic and social history with grand scale theorising which laid out the foundations of the social property relations approach. BrennerÕs position on the origins and development of capitalism is a highly sophisticated reconstruction of Maurice DobbÕs (1946) initial formulation that the transition to capitalism was a result of the internal contradictions of feudalism and that class struggle was the prime mover in bringing about this radical modal transformation. Like Dobb, Brenner also highlights the crisis of the thirteenth century, which was Ôrooted in declining agricultural productivity and the population drop-off which was its ultimate resultÕ (1978: 122) , as a crucial factor in the subsequent stratification between classes. At the end of this period of massive depopulation, feudal lords lost their ability to continue traditional forms of surplus appropriation and the ensuing class struggle culminated in the partial emancipation of the serfs (1982: 83Ð89). With the rise of tenant farming and the peasantsÕ ability to spend more time on their subsistence than in the lordÕs demesne, the English peasantry became much more inclined to adopt new production techniques. The order emerged from the entrails of the feudal economic orderÕ (1989a: 199 emphasis added). See also HobsbawmÕs comments in his introduction to Marx (1965: 36) .
BlautÕs own half-sketched proposal is very much in line with the commercialisation model and vulnerable to 5 transhistorical categorisations; yet the kernel of his critique of Eurocentrism emerges from the problematisation of the absence of the non-West rather than a strict adherence to the principles of the trade-led capitalist development model (Blaut 1993: 206 (Knight, 2002: 197Ð199) . Thus for Brenner, Europe, and more specifically
Western Europe becomes the Ôthe only active maker of historyÕ (Washbrook, 1990: 492) as capitalism emerges irreversibly in the sixteenth century and the rest of global social development takes place in a frozen history underpinned by a Ôunilinear and strictly endogenous causalityÕ (Torras, 1980: 262) .
The difficulty of re-animating this frozen history has been addressed and, to a certain property relationsÕ provides better conceptual and historical instruments as it is able Ôto theorize the transition to modern international relations and to draw out implications for early modern and modern processes of state-buildingÑand, by extension, the genesis of the modern European states-systemÕ (2003: 117).
As Political Marxism creates a direct association between international relations and Ôpolitically instituted class relationsÕ (Teschke, 2003: 272) , it has to explain how a specific set of class relations in one society can transform systemic arrangements in the international states-system, did not create the modern international system as the political multiplicity in the seventeenth century was largely composed of absolutist states operated on Ôdynastic sovereigntyÕ and compelled by the logic of Ôgeopolitical accumulationÕ (Teschke, 2002; 2003: 218) . In fact, the modern international states-system, with its internal relation to capital mediated through nation-states, only emerged Ôafter the European-wide spread of capitalismÕ as Ôthe series of European revolutions during the late 18th and 19th centuries and the ÔfreeingÕ of markets in favour of a world marketÕ gave birth to a new logic, replacing territorial accumulation with the accumulation of capital (Teschke, 2002: 37 2003: 267) . This abstraction is Ôin principleÕ correct as surplus appropriation in capitalism does not require the direct intervention of a political authority. However, one only needs to remember that the historical expansion of capitalism was Ôwritten in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fireÕ (Marx 1976: 875) as it was achieved through a set of coercive measures and maintainedÑboth in domestic and international spheresÑby a political will guaranteeing the survival of its core mechanisms to consider TeschkeÕs ÔprincipalÕ differentiation merely as a theoretical vantage point that can
only be applied to the capitalist state Ôin its ideal averageÕ (Marx, 1981: 970; cf. Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 568) . There is no reason to accept a highly formalistic and utilitarian separation between an ÔeconomisticÕ conception of capitalism and the political results of its expansion, then conceptualise the latter as a mere externality to the capitalist mode of production itself.
On the persistence of the ÔEuropean political pluriverseÕ (Teschke, 2003: 123) maintaining that their perspective Ôis not Eurocentric in the sense that it assumes something inherent to the course of European history as a wholeÕ. Rather, they insist on the particular significance of their ÔAnglocentrismÕ as it underscores Ôthe specificity of a regional sociopolitical transformation and the concomitant construction of new forms of economic and political subjectivity that would create consequences of world-historical relevanceÕ. This, however, signals precisely the deficit of Political Marxim as the prioritised Ôspecificity of a regional sociopolitical transformationÕ is understood without a clear appreciation of inter-societal developments which facilitate, condition or even determine the trajectory of various regional socio-economic and political configurations. combined development Ôthroughout the whole course of historyÕ (Trotsky, 2008 (Trotsky, : 5, 1969 (Trotsky, : 148, 1972 : 300); RosenbergÕs effort represents both a continuation of a line of theoretical interventions aimed at rebranding U&CD as Ôa general theory of the socio-economic dynamics of the historical processÕ (Lšwy, 1981: 87; Mandel, 1975: 23) and a novel endeavour to theorise a causal framework for inter-societal relations so as to reach Ôa sociological definition of the internationalÕ (Rosenberg, 2006: 313) .
In its recent reincarnation, the conceptÕs main strength stems from its latent receptivity to identify multiple trajectories and theorise the paths with which different socio-economic configurations have historically related to each other. U&CD thus potentially beckons the construction of a truly international theory, one which effectively moves beyond regionally or culturally bounded autocentric frameworks and Ôconceptualizes the process and outcomes of the interaction of diachronically simultaneous yet historically a-synchronous politiesÕ (Matin, 2007: 428) . Moreover, it embodies the recognition of multilinear development trajectories and reinforces the centrality of the international at the formulation of a general theory of social change. Within this formulation, Ô[e]ach instance of social change, therefore, always bears the marks of both the wider process of uneven and combined development in which it is actively entangled, as well as the effects of the more organic and localized determinations and features which ultimately render it analytically distinct and amenable to concrete analysisÕ (Matin, 2013: 368) . These methodological pointers have already been harnessed to provide historicotheoretical exegeses in two important pre-capitalist cases, namely Iran (Matin, 2007) and the Ottoman Empire (Nişancõoğlu, 2013) . MatinÕs study positions pre-modern Iran on a particular axis of development in which state formation is understood as a consequence of Ôdynamic, internationally generated combination . . . of the nomadic and agrarian politiesÕ (2007: 438).
Of note here is the extension of the parameters of state formation. By specifically incorporating the ÔinternationalÕ to the analysis, Matin is able to weave an analytical framework which is sensitive to the extant political and socio-economic relations in Iran and the conditioning developments which were structured through IranÕs interaction with its neighbours and its location in the international system. In NişancõoğluÕs work, the ÔinternationalÕ becomes a de-essentialised space of inter-societal reciprocity as the seemingly limited position is taken, U&CD becomes an intrinsic element of the era of capitalismÕs worldwide expansion and Ôis most usefully employed in the context of a theory of the capitalist mode of production, as capitalist social relationsÑand political formsÑare historically unique in their systematic generation of both combination and unevennessÕ (Ashman, 2009: 31; Davidson, 2009: 19) . Even here, the problem is not 9 necessarily the conceptÕs employment to explain Ôcombination and unevennessÕ perpetuated by capitalist expansion, but the way in which capitalist expansion itself is understood as a rather unilinear and diffusionist process.
My contention is that the temporally limited conceptualisation risks undermining ÔperipheralÕ societyÕs social, economic and political reorganisation both in domestic and international levels. The selection of the Ottoman Empire is not accidental. Due to its longlasting influence and direct involvement in as well as its geographical proximity to Europe, the Ottoman Empire can be identified as Ôthe dominant Other in the history of the European states systemÕ (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 330) . As a particularly relevant example of the peripheral expansion of capitalism and imperialist geopolitics of the 19th century (comparable, perhaps only to Russia), the Ottoman Empire represents significant opportunities to scrutinise and substantiate theoretical propositions advanced by Marxist IHS.
Moreover, its peculiar location in the literature, marked by either a curious absence or a contradictory presence, reveals the extent to which the approaches in question are illequipped or reluctant to engage with the non-West. Nevertheless, it is equally important to note that its specific treatment in the literature should be contextualised as part of a broader pattern in which a large portion of the IHS scholarship continually overlooks, subordinates or devalorises the experience of the non-Western societies.
In its first incarnation within the literature, the Ottoman Empire is represented essentially as an absent power in international politics. Despite the immediate centrality of the Ottoman-Christian (i.e. European) relationship in the formation of the early modern political system, we only find two passing references to the Ottomans in TeschkeÕs The Myth of 1648
Ñthe definitive IHS reconstruction of the era. This is a significant non-inclusion that cannot be justified by outlining the boundaries of the book as Ôthe genesis of the modern European states-systemÕ (Teschke, 2003: 117 emphasis added) . ÔThroughout nearly 600 years of its history, the Ottoman state was as much a part of the European political order as were its
French or Habsburg rivalsÕ (Quataert, 2005: 2Ð3) , yet beyond such descriptive categorisations, the Ottoman interaction with the European states during the early modern period marked a causal configuration in which both the individual states and the states-system # 20 in general were correspondingly affected. Explicit manifestations of such reciprocity can be observed in the period of Franco-Ottoman Alliance (16Ð19th c.) or in the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle which directly influenced the Atlantic expansion of the European maritime powers through the Ottoman control of Egypt and Syria (Jensen, 1985; Hess, 1973) .
In the second incarnation, the Ottoman Empire emerges as a Ôpre-modernÕ or ÔarchaicÕ state, locked in an immobile and lethargic non-history, only to be ÔpenetratedÕ by Western capitalist powers (cf. Wallerstein, 1979: 398) . Here, the deceptive image of the Ottoman 210)
The transformation of the Ottoman polity here is perceived as a unidirectional process which was exclusively imposed upon the empire by the capitalist West (assumed as an alreadyconstituted entity), thus overlooks the instances of active agency within the empire.
Correspondingly, the then ongoing sub-global and local level negotiations of the existing social, economic and political structures appear as exclusively imitative of the West or contingent on the incursion of imperialism. Accepting the formalistic framework offered by such analysesÑwhich is designed purely to differentiate the modalities of capitalist and noncapitalist compulsion for social changeÑprojects an entirely exogenous political and economic development in and a unilinear interaction of capitalist powers with the Ottoman Empire. The resulting picture vis-ˆ-vis the Ottoman Empire is a repetition of the Eurocentric arguments originally developed by European dominated historiography and IR, hence instead of recovering peripheral voices, the application of U&CD Ôerases the real subjects of history:
those who actually make it and from which any concept of development must ariseÕ (Rioux, 2009: 590) .
On the Political Marxist spectrum, a conditional agency is granted but the strict periodisation and classification between Ôpre-capitalistÕ and ÔcapitalistÕ states based on ÔAnglocentricÕ, hence non-corresponding (see İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 105Ð106, 404Ð405n.2) property relations render the 19th century Ottoman polity an inherently stagnant social formation, devoid of endogenous movement for change. Even when the internal reconfigurations are recognised, they are only interpreted as consequences of the ÔEastern
QuestionÕ, thus as mere ramifications of the great power imperialism in the Balkans and the Middle East. The geopolitical calculation surrounding the survival of the imperial territorial integrity in the form of the ÔEastern QuestionÕ dismisses Ôthe actual structure and dynamics of Ottoman societyÕ and further blocks the theorising of the emergent Turkish state form. This is accompanied by another round of exclusion as Ôthe Eastern Question is portrayed either as a European response to a purely degenerative and internally driven Ottoman decline, or as the safety-valve for the pressures emanating from the European balance of powerÕ (Bromley, 1994: 48, 99) . Interpretation of Tanzimat as a type of defensive modernisation (Shilliam, 2006: 382) is especially striking and indicative of non-engagement with the broader currents of historiography as many studies have conclusively revealed that the ÔTanzimat period cannot be considered simply as a phase of the Eastern Question, and examined from the outside looking inÕ (Davison, 1963: 8; Brown, 1984: 39) . that have revealed how (I) non-tributary social relations had begun permeating agricultural production and class relations as early as the 17th century (Kasaba 1987; Salzmann, 1994; Reyhan, 2008) , (II) the cultivatorsÕ struggles affected the central administrationÕs economic policies as well as the re-organisation of the property and landholding arrangements (Abou-El-Haj, 2005; Aytekin, 2012) , and (III) the subsequent reform movements themselves were shaped, to a certain degree, by social forces from below (Emiroğlu, 1999) as opposed to a reductionist, exclusively top-down narrative.
An empirically stronger, and theoretically non-reductionist reading of the nineteenth The following two centuries were marked by the gradual dissolution of the core tributary mechanisms. Provincial notables (ayans) and commercial intermediaries gained more influence through the control of land and production, as Ô[b]y the eighteenth century the applicability of tax farming had ceased to be restricted to the crown lands and was extended to cover all kinds of holdingsÕ (Kasaba 1987: 808) . In the eighteenth century, ayans effectively assumed the role of tax collectors (muhassõl) in the provinces while the central
administration had become increasingly reliant on the notables Ôfor the collection of taxes, maintenance of order, and the raising of auxiliary troopsÕ (Kasaba 1987: 812) . The further deterioration of the imperial economy and military capacity in the eighteenth century created more space for the ayans and intermediaries to position themselves as Ôde facto owners of fairly large estates by repeatedly purchasing farming privilegesÕ by means of Ôconversion of tax farms into property-like holdings by acquiring life-long deeds or leases, by establishing pious foundations, or by using forceÕ (Kasaba 1987: 808Ð809) . ÔExperimentation with revenue extraction reached its peak in the eighteenth century with the extensive practice of mŸlk grants, which converted public lands outright into registered private propertyÕ (Abou-El- A recent wave in Marxist social theory has produced strong counter-arguments against MarxÕs Eurocentrism and attempted to absolve certain tenets of historical materialism of its own Eurocentric and provincialist variations. Here, the initial textual reading of Marx is 11 built upon his various discussions on pre-capitalist societies, the emergence of capitalism in
Europe and the evolution of his general theory of history in the Grundrisse and Capital.
Equally important, however, is the renewed focus on some of MarxÕs less analysed material, including his ÔEthnological NotebooksÕ (Marx, 1972) , notebooks on world history, and letters and exchanges he penned down from the mid-1870s to 1882. The first and foremost lesson to be drawn from these writings is that Marx explicitly rejected any unilateral trajectory of historical social development, refuting, in the process, the myth that his theory of history is Ôan account of history whose teleology was always directed towards an inexorable closureÕ (Young, 1990: 6 historical circumstances in which they are placedÕ (Marx, 1989a: 200) . Precisely because there is no Ôformula of a general historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historicalÕ (Marx, 1989a: 201) , MarxÕs theorising of capitalist developmentÑ starting from the tracing of its most concrete components to the creation of universal abstractions which generate general conceptual frameworks in which different manifestations can be examinedÑnaturally assumes a polychromatic picture of global development. (Marx, 1989b: 360; 1989c: 370; 1976: 876 original emphasis). While the Marx-Zasulich exchange revolves around the issue of RussiaÕs Ôuneven and combinedÕ transition to capitalism, MarxÕs broader point about the Ômultilinear character of historical developmentÕ (Vitkin, 1982: 63) (Marx, 1975) . This is also one of the most grossly misunderstood aspects of the whole debate on the Asiatic mode of production, wherein MarxÕs conception was constructed not as a materialist reworking of the Eurocentric concept of ÔOriental DespotismÕ, but as an attempt to capture the paths of divergence among different societies based on their production relations. What is missing in many Marxist critiques of the Asiatic mode of production, such as the one spearheaded by Perry Anderson (1974: 462Ð549) , is an appreciation of the Ôheterogeneity of MarxÕs conception of the EastÕ (Vitkin, 1982: 65 (Shanin, 1983: 31) .
In short, ÔLate MarxÕ offers a distinct methodology capable of theorising inter-societal unity and a rich spectrum of non-autocentric conceptions of social change and development.
While some of these rehabilitative proposals to counteract the deep-rooted Eurocentrism of the discipline are found in a fragmentary and scattered manner in MarxÕs writings, they unequivocally underline that Marx took important steps towards the re-interiorisation of the non-West into historical materialism. Given the wealth of historical evidence and research available to the scholars today, compiling and reconstructing the missing pieces in MarxÕs puzzle should be welcomed as an essential task with which to formulate an international theory that Ôsystematically incorporates the causal significance of [societiesÕ] asynchronous interaction . . . into an explanation of their individual and collective development and change over timeÕ (Rosenberg, 2006: 335) .
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Conclusion
The genealogy of IR theorising reveals repeated attempts at conceptualising the ways in which internally varied political actors constitute a coherent international system and at explaining how and why such actorsÑthe boundaries of which are drawn along the lines of territory, political organisation, culture and economyÑcan and do coexist within such systems. From the English SchoolÕs normative international institutionalism to the most recent attempts at rebranding inter-societal relations as a determining causality in the form of societalÕ relations and to position them as a constitutive aspect of the ÔinternationalÕ system succeeds only to the extent that Ôinter-societalÕ is understood as Ôbetween European societiesÕ and the ÔinternationalÕ devolves into Ôintra-European relationsÕ (Hobson, 2009: 674; 2011: 152) . While recognising the pivotal restructuring of sovereignty in capitalist formations as the separation of political and economic spheres, none of these accounts substantially examine the differentiated and/or preserved forms of absolutist or the so-called parcellised forms of sovereignty in coeval non-capitalist societies. A direct consequence of this unipolarity is the elevation of a strictly regional phenomenon (restructuring of European sovereignty with the emergence of capitalist social forces and the consequent alteration of the wider European states-system) to a general theory of capitalist state and international states-system.
Formulation of such a theory, inadvertently or not, suggests a particularly universalised accommodation of and transition to a political structure marked by capitalist sovereignty. The rise of the modern European state, with its path dependent social transformation, effortlessly becomes the foundation of a European states-system composed of more or less similarly structured former absolutist states which had remodeled themselves through bourgeois revolutions, political revolutions from above or simply through the collapse of the former social order from within. This Eurocentric international theory, however, does not, and more importantly cannot, account for the variegated trajectories of state formation outside Europe as they neither conform to the predefined paths of social and political reorganisation nor are deemed part of the ÔinternationalÕ system from which the general theory emerges. By the same token, it does not recognise the role of non-European states in the constitution of the European states-system, let alone their constant interaction in the composition of an international political multiplicity.
Within the boundaries of Marxist IHS, a non-Eurocentric reconfiguration can be undertaken with a view to conceptualising the longue durŽe of the development of capitalism
and modern states-system as an instance of Ôconnected historiesÕ, the nature of which can be unearthed Ônot by comparison alone, but by seeking out the at times fragile threads that connected the globeÕ (Subrahmanyam, 1997: 761Ð762) . In this case, these Ôfragile threadsÕ reveal themselves as social relations that spanned across the world, bridged different spatial scales from local to global, and most importantly encompassed a high degree of corresponding influence between and synchronicity in the ÔWestÕ and the ÔrestÕ. Instead of resorting to completely new methodological frameworks to overcome the inherent questions of Eurocentrism and provincialism, I maintain that a re-reading of MarxÕs writings on both the development of capitalism in Western Europe and non-Western societies could provisionally provide a way out of the ÔEurocentric cul-de-sacÕ which continues to dominate the conceptual discussions in the literature (Hobson, 2011: 148) . It could do so by following the Ôspirit of MarxÕ (Dussel, 2001: 14) in advancing a universal (but not homogenising)
historical-theoretical framework which remains attentive to different social, political and economic conditions constituted along the axis of varying temporal and spatial configurations. This endeavour, however, should not be undertaken in isolation, but requires substantial engagement with the growing global history and postcolonial literatures. Most importantly, it necessitates a genuine effort to enter a dialogue with the peripheral voices and histories, not so much as to ÔfitÕ their realities into pre-ordained frameworks but to understand and position them as parts of a truly ÔinternationalÕ system in which they operate.
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